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The Death Rattle of Open Access and the Advent




In considering fisheries regulation in the next decade, I make a concluding
point that may become a major theme. This is that individual permanent catch
quotas of a regulator-determined TAC are only a stage in the development of
management from licensing to private rights (Scott 1989).
The condition of open access in fisheries is widely accepted as the cause of over-
investment in the harvest of fisheries. Less appreciated is the fact that open access is
also the source of massive over-investments in fisheries administration and research.
Redundancy in fisheries capital and labor is matched by redundancy in fisheries sci-
entists, social scientists and managers.
The waste in fisheries research and administration is associated with the two
kinds of paradigms generally accepted by analysts and administrators. The first
paradigm is that of models based on the continuation of open access, and the second
is that of models based on the assumption of the need for government to resolve the
problems of open access. I suggest that these paradigms are of decreasing relevance
and that reliance on them is misleading many of us involved in fisheries research.
We are giving excessive attention to the wrong set of issues and ignoring the matters
that should be addressed. Paradigms lost must be replaced by paradigms gained.
To characterize the old paradigms, I borrow an analogy developed thirty years
ago by the late Don Bevan. Don translated fisheries regulations into regulations for
lumbering with superb ridicule. Some of the items were: “Logging will be permitted
on Tuesdays and Fridays, subject to extension or restriction by field announcement.
It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to use, employ, or operate a
power-driven saw for the purpose of removing timber. No logging truck shall be
longer than 30 feet overall except trucks that logged prior to January 1, 1960. Trees
with cones can be taken only prior to July 31” (Bevan 1965).
I would like to do an imitation of Don’s analogy by translating the Code of Con-
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duct for Responsible Fisheries, promulgated by the United Nations Food and Agri-
culture Organization (FAO 1995), into a Code of Conduct for Responsible Agricul-
ture. I do so, by substituting agricultural terms for fisheries terms.
Article 7.2.1: Recognizing that long-term sustainable use of fisheries [land] re-
sources is the overriding objective of conservation and management, States should
adopt appropriate measures, based on the best scientific evidence available, which
are designed to maintain or restore stocks [land resources] at levels capable of pro-
ducing maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and eco-
nomic factors.
Article 7.6.1: States should establish effective mechanisms for fisheries [agricul-
ture]  monitoring, surveillance, control and enforcement to ensure compliance with
their conservation and management measures.
Article 7.6.2: States should adopt measures to ensure that no vessel [tractor] be al-
lowed to fish [farm] unless so authorized.
Article 7.6.7: In the evaluation of alternative conservation and management mea-
sures, their cost-effectiveness and social impact should be considered.
Article 8.1.8: States should, as appropriate, maintain records of fishers [farmers]
which should, wherever possible, contain information on their service and qualifi-
cations, including certificates of competency, in accordance with national law.
Admittedly, there are certain characteristics to fishery resources which dictate
different approaches to management than are appropriate for agriculture. But, in
general, the kinds of principles advanced by the Code of Conduct fail to recognize
that fishing is an economic activity which should be, and will be, governed by prop-
erty rights regimes. I suggest that such property regimes will provide the paradigms
for the future, and that these will significantly change the role of both government
and researchers, making archaic, and possibly damaging, the kind of principles ad-
vanced by the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. I believe that the proper
role of government in the management of fisheries is to get government out of the
role of managing the fisheries.
The transition to property rights regimes in fisheries is occurring with a speed
which, I think, is not fully appreciated. The process is inexorable. It is also associ-
ated with a high degree of real pain for the participants. The danger is that, attempts
to alleviate the pain may, unless carefully taken, result in long-term imperfections in
the ultimate outcome. The challenge we all face is to facilitate the transition in such
a way that the imperfections are minimized.
This paper is an attempt to collate mention of the new paradigm by Anthony
Scott and several others (Hannesson, in press; Townsend 1995; Arnason 1993; Wilen
1989; Troadec 1995) and to move one small step further in what Anthony Scott sug-
gests “may become a major theme.” The paper begins with a discussion of the
present paradigms and the costs associated with maintaining them. It then postulates
the future paradigms as a basis for setting the goals towards which we should be
striving and for identifying the most significant obstacles in the path. The forces at
work which are leading to the new paradigms are discussed. The paper concludes
with an identification of some of the challenges for administration and research.
Paradigms Lost
The present paradigms for fisheries management are based on the prevailing condi-
tion of open access to the resources and the presumption that governments will have
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prescriptions for dealing with the problems are to acquire more information on the
resources and the fisheries, and to leave in the hands of governments the consider-
ation and adoption of measures for closing access. These elements shape the pat-
terns of research and debate, as well as the approaches to fisheries management.
Characteristics of the Present Paradigm
The characteristics of the present paradigms can be described in terms of the inter-
ests and activities of the different participants in the management of fisheries. This
includes those involved in research and those involved in harvesting, related indus-
tries, and administration.
Researchers.  There is a generalized acceptance of the present paradigms by
those who conduct research on the biological, sociological, and economic aspects of
fisheries. This limits the perspectives and range of research and tends to be self rein-
forcing. The following discussion of the role and interests of the participants in fish-
eries management is deliberately provocative. It makes use of unseemly generaliza-
tions as a means for goring oxen and sacred cows, in the hope that some of the oxen
and cows will be stimulated to adopt the new paradigm.
(a) Biological and ecological research.  Marine biologists have long had their
innings as the presumed progenitors of fisheries management. They have, however,
two sets of failings: (i) their belief that what’s good for the fish is good for mankind;
and (ii) their presumption that, given the right information, governments will make
the right decisions.1
The concept that a certain level of biological yield is of value to society persists
in the minds of the biologists and has led to the adoption of management measures
designed to reach these yields. The principle of Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY),
whose death has been pronounced many times, continues its influence, as noted
above in the Code of Conduct (Article 7.2.1). Its presumed replacement, Optimum
Sustainable Yield (OSY), has totally failed to be a useful guide for decisions, as is to
be expected since we all have different optimums.
Having persuaded fishery administrators of the importance of preserving the
fish through the establishment of fixed levels of yield, these types of biologists have
induced the administrators to adopt such damaging controls as a total allowable
catch, ignoring the costs associated with the measures and supporting the misguided
concept that management can be achieved without the redistribution of wealth.
Considerable public investments have been made in biological research, with few
practical results. For example, the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas
has been studying the fish stocks of the Northeast Atlantic for a century and has pro-
duced abundant information on the status of the stocks. Yet the benefits to society from
these stocks can be found only in the employment of redundant labor and capital.
Although there are clearly other impediments to the making of decisions than
the lack of adequate biological information, many biologists do not appear to be
concerned. They continue to undertake stock assessments and plea for the primacy
of achieving a sustainable yield. There is a certain irony to their plea for more sup-
port for the production of more information. Under the present paradigms, only gov-
ernments are willing to pay for assessment of stocks and information on the their lo-
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cation and movements. Since governments may be becoming aware of the dubious
value of the information, the funds are likely to diminish.2 Under paradigms of prop-
erty rights, however, holders of the rights will have an interest in acquiring the in-
formation and will be willing to bear the costs (or at least some of them). “As a case
in point, the northern Australian prawn fishers, following their adoption of a limited
entry scheme, found it in their interests to finance routine stock assessments to al-
low them to take the largest and highest priced prawns. The critical importance of
this point can be indicated by the fact that research budgets of the private forestry
industry are many times greater than those of the private fishing industry. For ex-
ample, a single forest company in the United States (Weyerhauser) spends about $70
million per year on research and development” (Troadec and Christy 1990).
Arnason “argues that in most ocean fisheries, the data requirements for the
calculation of optimal tax rates, catch quotas, etc. greatly exceed the capacity
of any resource manager. It follows that management systems based on such ap-
proaches are of little practical use. On the other hand, there appear to exist institu-
tional arrangements that allow the resource manager to take advantage of the market
mechanism in order to solve the management problem...The fundamental proposi-
tion is that within the framework of the share quota system...and given certain addi-
tional assumptions, the quota authority can attain economic efficiency in the fishery
by simply maximizing the market value of total outstanding quotas at each
point of time” (Arnason 1989). “Once the fishermen acquire control over the
means of production, they will have the incentive to invest in and heed scien-
tific advice” (Christy 1986).
(b) Sociological and anthropological research.  Sociologists and anthropologists
are relative newcomers to the field of fisheries management. They entered the fray
when they discovered that traditional systems of fisheries management by fishermen
communities were being destroyed by the intrusion of large scale operations into
their grounds; an intrusion which was aided by the support of development agencies
and the lack of awareness of the value of the traditional approaches. Fisheries soci-
ologists and anthropologists have also gained strength from the growth in interest in
community management of common property resources (National Research Council
1986). Some economists, the author included, have also pursued the concept of com-
munity-based fisheries management (see Christy 1993, 1982).
The concern of the sociologists and anthropologists is, as it should be, with the
issues of wealth distribution and concepts of equity. Unfortunately, they carry in
their concern a large burden of myth. Several myths can be mentioned. One myth is
that there is a difference between developed and developing states in the setting of
objectives for fisheries management and in the choice of management regime.
Though I am not a sociologist, I have adopted this myth. I once stated that develop-
ing countries were special because of the lack of alternative employment opportuni-
ties (Christy 1986a). But it should have been stated in the obverse; i.e., that where
there are no alternative employment opportunities (in developed as well as develop-
ing countries), a case might be made for special, transitional management regimes.
Stating it this way helps to avoid the trap of adopting protective approaches which
serve to perpetuate poverty rather than progressive ones which allow for develop-
2 “Fishery management alternatives that made sense in an era of massive annual data collection and
analysis are being challenged as funds for research, management, and enforcement agencies are cut year
after year. Rights based fishery management, if it can be designed to reduce public expenditures, is
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ment.3 It is not in the interests of countries to exclude small-scale fishermen from
opportunities for economic growth.
Another myth associated with the paradigm of open access is that access to fish-
eries is not, in fact, open, but rather subject to “common property rights” and a “law
of the commons.” The initial definition of common property in fisheries comes from
Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop: “The concept implies that potential resource users who
are not members of a group of co-equal owners are excluded” (Ciriacy-Wantrup and
Bishop 1975). The presumption that common property in fisheries is pervasive is
made by McCay: “For North America, where common property is the preeminent
law of the sea and inland waters, we may posit the existence of a ‘culture of the
commoners’” (McCay 1988).
There are two fundamental difficulties with this view: it assumes a stasis in
fisheries employment; and it assumes that no one can become a fisher unless he or
she is already a member of a group of fishers. The question is begged as to how one
becomes a member of the group. But the question can, and should, be raised because
of the likelihood that there has been a high degree of mobility into fisheries.
Unfortunately, little attention has been paid by researchers to the critical issue
of labor mobility into, and out of, open access fisheries; or how one becomes a
member of a commons. One of the few studies that I know of states that “both the
extreme positions of perfect mobility assumed by the open access theory and of total
immobility advanced by small-scale fisheries studies, are rejected in favor of imper-
fect but substantial mobility constrained by location, occupation, and household spe-
cific factors” (Panayotou and Panayotou 1986). In the case of the U.S., it can be
noted that estimates of the number of fishermen show an increase of 3% per year in
the decade following the extension of jurisdiction. The question can be raised as to
whether this growth came entirely from within the membership in the “commons” or
whether it included entry by people outside the “commons.”
The second difficulty with this view is that it leads to the belief that the com-
moners, having control of the resources, are able to make the management deci-
sions. Many examples of effective management by commoners are cited in the lit-
erature. In most of these cases, the user group or community has a form of territorial
use right (TURF) which excludes outsiders, either formally or by tradition. Where
TURFs exist, access is controlled and the members of the user group have the op-
portunity to fulfill the functions of management. However, the evidence of depleted
fisheries indicates that either TURFs do not exist in the majority of fisheries, or that
they have been massively ineffective in preventing waste.
There is no question that there are severe distributional issues associated with
the closure of access to fisheries. Unfortunately, the development of property rights
in any resource has always led to a redistribution of wealth, which cannot be
avoided. It should also be pointed out that continuation of the open access regime is
always associated with a dissipation of wealth. In both cases, there are losers.
(c) Economic research.  An examination of economic research under the para-
digm of open access can best be summarized by remarks by Anthony Scott, who is
in the forefront in the study of property rights in fisheries. He stated that his paper
in 1955 (one of the seminal papers in the literature) “did deal with the possibilities
of sole ownership, comparing that regime with common property in various aspects,
3 In a discussion of “social legislation in oystering” under which technologically and economically effi-
cient gear was prohibited in favor of the use of individual tongs, McCay stated that “it may have the
intent and effect of maintaining equity in opportunities to harvest oysters, because it is difficult for any
person or group to monopolize the resource with tongs alone. Moreover, entry is limited to those willing
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including incentives to invest in the stock and to optimize over time. However, the
idea of property was soon forgotten, as most economists turned their attention to im-
proving the biological production function and to studying regulation. Subsequent
1960s work took open access as inevitable. Turvey introduced Pigovian externality
analysis and much else in 1957. Thereafter, analytical energy was expended on alter-
native regulatory regimes, ranging from control over seasonal openings to mesh
sizes... Licences, employed simply as administrative elements in these control
schemes, were not analyzed as rights” (Scott 1989).4
To this can be added the point that much of the economic literature has been
more concerned with theoretical models than with problems of applying the models
to real situations. This should not be particularly surprising since academic econo-
mists are rewarded more by work on the refinement of models than by participating
in the dirty tasks of making real decisions.
Although recent papers by some economists adumbrate the new paradigm (see
Scott 1989; Hannesson in press; Arnason 1993; Townsend 1995) I am not aware of
any that attempt to characterize how the new paradigm will shape fisheries manage-
ment and the economy of the industry, and yet both will be significantly different.
Stakeholders.  The present paradigm can also be characterized by the stakehold-
ers in fisheries management: administrators, politicians, fishermen, and those in af-
filiated sectors. The interests of these groups in the condition of open access have
been described elsewhere and need be only briefly summarized here (see Christy, in
press; Hannesson, in press; Scott 1988). There are those who want to preserve the
paradigm of open access and are offering it intensive care. In some cases, they do so
for very good reasons of self interest, recognizing that they will be among the los-
ers. I have no quarrel with them, except when they pretend that their self interest is
in the general interest of society. In other cases, intensive care is given to the dying
paradigm by those who focus on the pain of change but fail to appreciate the greater,
though less apparent, pain of preserving open access.
(a) Administrators. “Having no direct interest in institutional change, public or-
ganizations often react to avoid failures in prospect, rather than act to reap new op-
portunities. They may see negatively the distributional effects on the small scale
sector of the adoption of market mechanisms, the change in scope of their interven-
tions in management (from the provision of support to the industry to resource stew-
ardship, from a command to an economic mode of allocation), or the political risk
attached to the promotion of institutional change” (Troadec 1995).
Except for a few countries (e.g., New Zealand and Iceland), fishery administra-
tors focus their major efforts on dealing with the problems of open access. They do
so because of ignorance, choice, or the absence of appropriate authority. Where igno-
rance is an impediment, it is due to the prevailing, long persistent emphasis that has
been given to stock assessment and the health of the fish stocks rather than to societal
benefits. Many fishery administrators have emerged from backgrounds in biology,
with an absence of training in the social sciences. For them, “fish come first.”5
4 In 1983, E.A. Keen, a geographer, made a strong argument for sole ownership in fisheries. He stated
that “sole ownership as a right system  for marine resources has received almost no attention in the lit-
erature of fisheries management. It warrants far more consideration in view of its demonstrated efficacy
with other resources. Reasons for its neglect appear to rest more in personal values and ideology than in
an objective analysis of its potential” (Keen 1983).
5 On two separate occasions administrators have told me that the halibut fisheries of the northeast Pa-
cific were in fine shape—and this was when the season for halibut was less than one day long. One of
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In other cases, they restrict their views to the open access condition because of
choice. The creation of property rights regimes requires the devolution of manage-
ment authority to private groups, which means a loss of power for them. “If the
characteristics of individual and collective rights can be substituted for bureaucratic
decision-making and enforcement, the demand for specialized administrators should
decline” (Scott 1988).
I suspect, however, that the fundamental reason for their restricted view is that
the move to property rights regimes cannot be made without making decisions on
the distribution of wealth—and administrators do not generally have the mandate to
make such decisions that must be made in the political arena. I am sure that many, if
not most, fishery administrators are aware of the need for closing access, but are un-
able to do so without political support. The problems in the Northeast Atlantic pro-
vide ample evidence of the dilemma. Administrators are pushing for reduction in
fishing capacity while, at the same time, politicians are giving out grants for vessel
improvements.
(b) Politicians.  Politicians do not benefit from the condition of open access in
fisheries, but they are likely to incur severe costs from closing access. They will
only willingly make decisions to redistribute wealth when the costs of not doing so
outweigh the benefits. In this calculation, the potential economic rents that can ac-
crue to national economies by closing access, although they may be extraordinarily
large, are invisible. Theoretical considerations have seldom been a significant influ-
ence on political decisions (Marx and company excepted). In the U.S., for example,
it appears anomalous that the Republican majority in Congress in 1994–96 does not
accept the idea that property rights in fisheries are as important to the free market
system as property rights in other natural resource industries.6
More important in the politicians’ calculations are the noises made by their con-
stituents. Decisions will be made when conflict creates sufficient noise as in the
case of the U.S. halibut fishery. The theoretical arguments in favor of closed access
in the halibut fishery had been thoroughly and competently made as far back as
1961 (Crutchfield and Zellner 1961). But it was not until 1994, thirty years later,
when the season dropped to less than one day in length, that the Individual Transfer-
able Quota system was adopted.
The ability to make the necessary decisions on wealth distribution is inversely
proportional to the degree of vested interests in the fishery. It is not surprising that
the countries with the most advanced management regimes (New Zealand and Aus-
tralia) are those which have had the shortest history in fishing; or that the areas
where the problems are most difficult (the Northeast Atlantic) are where there has
been the longest history and where employment in fisheries is well entrenched.
(c) Fishermen and affiliated industries.  The difficulty with attempts to charac-
terize the views of fishermen with regard to open access is the disparity of situa-
tions, experience, and opinions. Differences include: highliners against average fish-
ermen; newcomers against old hands (or traditional fishermen); part-time vs. full-
time fishermen; captains vs. crew members; large-scale vs. small-scale; users of
fixed gear vs. users of mobile gear; and others.
In the light of this amalgam of interests and perceptions, generalizations about
fishermen represent an area where angels fear to tread. Although this has not pre-
6 In the recent revision of the Magnuson Act, Senator Stevens of Alaska inserted a ban on the use of
Individual Transferable Quotas in order to protect his constituent fish processors. He did this on the pre-
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vented such fools as myself from rushing in (Christy, in press), I will exercise some-
what more timidity on this occasion.
Somewhat easier to characterize are the interests of those linked fore and aft to
fishing. It probably can be said with some degree of assurance that boat builders and
gear makers look with horror on the idea that access to fisheries should be closed.
The very concept that boats should not only be removed from the industry but also
destroyed must turn their stomachs (unless they can prevail on the powers-that-be
that vessel replacement and improvement should be subsidized).
At the aft end, there may also be some apprehensions about the closure of
access. With open access, the derby that results means that fishermen have virtually
no opportunity to influence the prices they receive. With a one day season, a hold
filled with perishable goods, and a limited number of buyers, the fishermen will take
whatever price they can get. “Owners of processing plants, vessel repair facilities,
and associated businesses locate themselves close to fishing grounds when fishing
seasons are short and furious. Land rents at these locations can clearly fall precipi-
tously when the rights based fishery makes it unnecessary to unload fish rapidly and
frequently at remote sites. For example, land owners and businessmen in the thriv-
ing fishing town of Kodiak, Alaska, may correctly perceive that their advantages in
the crab, halibut, salmon, and groundfish fisheries depend partly on the open access
competition in the fishery” (Huppert 1989).7 A contrary view may be held by proces-
sors who are closer to markets than to the producers since, under a rationalized fish-
ery, they are more likely to have access to the catch of the fishermen.
Significance of the Present Paradigm
The significance of the characteristics of the present paradigm lies in the ways in
which they interfere with the forces for institutional change. Three kinds of impedi-
ments can be mentioned.
One impediment results from the long history of biological approaches to man-
agement. The entrenched position of biologists in the management process tends to
narrow the field of choice among alternative measures to those that achieve
“sustainability” of stocks (whatever that is). Although economic aspects are cur-
rently included in many fishery management plans, they tend to be subordinate to
the concept that the stocks must be conserved. The predominance of biologists also
leads to the allocation of scarce public funds to research on biological aspects, with
little left over for economic or social research. Economic data is almost nonexistent
in most countries and there is sparse information on costs and revenues.
The second impediment to change is the persistent and prevailing reliance on
governments to fulfill the functions of management. This leads to a focus of debate
and analysis on present approaches to management:  (i) conservation measures; (ii)
license limits; or (iii) ITQs. Considerable attention is devoted to ways in which gov-
ernments can control by-catch, reduce over-capacity, prevent seepage in license
limit schemes, achieve sustainable yields, and more important, make allocation deci-
sions among competing uses and users. With regard to the last function, govern-
ments are asked to achieve balance among multiple and diverse interests: maintain-
7 In a poignant message to the Fishfolk list on the Internet, Cindy Amberfield, the owner of Beryl’s
Sweetshop in Kodiak, provided strong evidence of Huppert’s point, in terms of the significant decline in
patronage in the 1995–96 season. She blamed the economic losses on the establishment of ITQs for hali-
but and the “loss of business in the processing sector due to ‘vertical integration’ of the fishery (fishers
owning the fish before they are caught, and thus having the right and the resource to market them as
they will)” which resulted in only three of the eleven canneries in Kodiak operating during the peak of
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ing employment opportunities for small-scale fishermen, preserving life styles, pre-
venting the domination of big business, preventing mammal mortality, and enhanc-
ing opportunities for recreational fishermen, as well as ensuring that fishermen have
adequate incomes.
The importance of these allocation decisions raises the third and perhaps most
important impediment to change. By definition, the creation of exclusive use rights
(whether a license limit, ITQ, or TURF) means that some gain and some lose.
Wealth distribution cannot be avoided—and, thus, issues of equity cannot be
avoided. “Since private versus public ownership of resources and means of produc-
tion has been at the core of ideological disputes for more than a century, it is natural
to expect ITQs to be controversial” (Hannesson, in press).
The difficulty of making such decisions will delay the evolution to property
rights regimes. What is worse is that, in attempts to placate the losers, imperfections
may be built into the systems which will preclude, or impede, optimum solutions.
For example, attempts to protect the presumedly desirable “life styles” of fishermen,
which might be considered as attempts to achieve maximum sustainable anachro-
nisms, could lead to both technological and economic inefficiencies, as well as per-
petual poverty. The prohibition against the use of motors on oyster dredging vessels
in the Maryland waters of the Chesapeake Bay may have preserved the last remain-
ing commercial sailing fleet in the U.S., but it has also preserved a life style which
is marked by “low returns from arduous labor.”
Paradigms Gained
To examine the future paradigm for fisheries management, the fantasy of a com-
pletely unfettered market, with permanent use rights and no restrictions on transfer
of rights, provides a useful rhetorical device. It can be used to examine the goals to-
ward which we should be striving, provide some basis for evaluation of progress,
and help in the identification of the most significant obstacles.
Model Modus Operandi
Under this paradigm gained, property rights will exist for all fisheries (capture and
cultured, fresh and marine), both within and outside of national jurisdiction. The
rights will be either territorial use rights in fisheries (TURFs) or stock use rights in
fisheries (SURFs). Satisfactory control within a TURF is a matter of the habits of
the stocks—whether sedentary (e.g., oysters) or migratory (e.g., tunas). In the latter
case, it is not necessary that the control cover all areas within which the stock
moves; simply that there be sufficient control to allow the production of economic
rents. Thus, the use of fixed gear, such as fish aggregation devices and stake nets,
may also serve as the basis for a TURF. In the Philippines, for example, tuna fishing
companies control access to the areas around the fish aggregation devices which
they have planted. However, since there are numerous stocks which would be diffi-
cult to cover within a “territory,” the alternative would be the establishment of ex-
clusive use rights to the stock (or related stocks) under the concept of a SURF (see
Townsend 1995a).
Under these hypothetical arrangements, the holders of the TURF or SURF rights
could be individuals, communities, cooperatives, or corporations. They would have
the incentives to take over most of the four basic functions of management from
governments, i.e., (i) determining their objectives, (ii) acquiring information, (iii)
allocating capital and labor, and (iv) ensuring compliance with their regulations.Christy 296
With regard to determining objectives, it is likely that the general aim would be
to maximize net economic revenues over the long run. However, for cooperative-
held or community-held rights, the objectives might be modified to include employ-
ment or other goals. There would be an incentive for them to acquire information of
various kinds including the status and yield of the stocks, the determination of total
allowable catches (TACs), stock interrelationships, stock movements and location,
prices and markets, etc.8 As owners, they would automatically have the interest in
allocating capital and labor at the optimum rate with regard to their objectives and
also the interest in investing in technological innovations in both cost reductions and
revenue increases. As to enforcement, they would engage in monitoring catches and
the surveillance of their areas of rights. The enforcement functions of arrest, trial,
and punishment would most likely lie with governments although, in the case of co-
operative or community rights, peer pressure would be effective in ensuring compli-
ance.
This ultimate devolution of management authority and responsibility to indi-
viduals and groups would mean significant changes in the role of governments. The
role would presumably be akin to that of public agriculture or forestry departments,
largely facilitating the private entrepreneurs in their activities, such as: (i) conduct-
ing research where the scale is beyond the means of private investors or where the
product of the research would be available and beneficial to all; (ii) monitoring use
to ensure that resources are not over-used; (iii) setting means for dealing with exter-
nalities visited on the fisheries or created by them; and (iv) ensuring that the exclu-
sive use rights are exclusive. “The state would become redundant as a management
authority and its only role would be the ultimate upholding of the rule of law and
the honoring of contracts” (Hannesson, in press). One of the major benefits of the
new paradigm would be the reduction of public costs for fisheries management.
Possible Imperfections
This fantasy will certainly be anathema to some people and groups such as
Greenpeace. “Individual Transferable Quotas are about deciding who has the right to
fish based on a market approach. It is clear that ITQ systems have the potential to
radically alter the nature of participatory rights in fisheries...The question, which
has yet to be answered, is whether ITQs will serve the best interests of fishers, fish-
eries conservation, the environment, and the public at large” (Greer 1995).
Greenpeace’s answer to the question is a resounding “no.” A more balanced answer
might be “Yes, in general.”
Just as the agriculture, grazing, and forest industries abound with imperfections,
so will fisheries under a property rights regimes—but perhaps a little more so be-
cause of the mobility of the resources. Several possible sources of imperfections can
be mentioned. Some are inherent to the regime. Others, discussed later, will be the
consequence of constraints imposed in the process of establishing the regime.
Big business.  The major objection expressed by Greenpeace, and held by other
groups as well, is the fear that there will be a “Big Business Takeover of Fisheries”
and the corollary that the small fishers will lose out. “Thus with ITQs, access to the
8 “If fishing rights are permanent, the resource will in effect become a shared property of those who hold
the rights. Under this arrangement it is indeed likely that the holders of the use rights would assume the
full responsibility for managing the resource, from stock assessment through the setting of total allow-
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right to fish becomes a property right that is most easily controlled by large corpora-
tions” (Greer 1995). The same view was expressed over a hundred years ago in the
conflict between those using fixed gear (pounds, weirs, and traps) and those using
hook and line. The fixed gear, based on a form of TURF, attracted big business;
whereas, the mobile gear, based on open access, was the province of the small scale
fishermen. The opposition to big business can be illustrated by a statement, whose
echoes reverberate today.
Even supposing, for the sake of argument, that these wholesale methods of tak-
ing fish do not, on the whole, injure the fisheries, by what right does any man,
or set of men, take all the fishes of the sea which they can catch as his or
theirs? Have the public no rights? Has not every individual some rights which
these monopolists are bound to respect? I wonder that the people have so long
consented to be robbed, and for no better reason than that large moneys are in-
vested in the business...See the hundreds of thousands of barrels of fish...which
they have taken in their traps...the profits of which they have pocketed, and to
which they had no legal or moral right if their modes of fishing deprive the
poorer fishermen of what was legally and morally theirs (Palmer 1873).
This same apprehension accompanied the enclosure of the western grazing lands
in the U.S. “It is feared by some that under any system of control the large owners
and corporations would secure a monopoly in the use of pasture land, and the young
men starting in the business of stock raising would have no opportunity to build up
under a lease system” (Hibbard 1939).
These concerns, but not the conclusions, are entirely justifiable. By definition
the closing of access excludes some users, potential if not present. By definition, the
need to reduce overcapacity will lead to a concentration of rights in the hands of
fewer fishermen than exist at present. With full transferability of rights, there will be
an opportunity for monopoly control and it is possible that such control could fall
into the hands of big business (however that is defined).9
Whether control does actually fall into the hands of big business depends, at
least in part, as to how one defines big business; ranging from a fisherman-owned
corporation with two vessels to a Microsoft. It also depends on whether the big busi-
ness has an interest in participating in the harvest sector.
Aside from the issue of “equity,” which is addressed below, the problem is
whether the control of a TURF or SURF gives monopoly power to the owner suffi-
cient to dictate price. If it does, then the question is whether the monopoly rents that
may be gained are more damaging to society than the rents lost under open access.
Furthermore, controls against monopolistic practices are common in most countries,
although they appear to flow and ebb in response to current fads.
Mining stocks.  Another possible imperfection is that the owners of the rights
will mine the stocks; “over-fishing” them in the interests of short-term gains. Those
who adopt the precept that “fish come first”  or consider “sustainability” to be sa-
cred, view this possibility with alarm. But there are other views. One question is
whether the tenure provided with ownership will create sufficient incentive to en-
sure that the stock produces a long term yield. In general, it is likely that it would.
There may be situations where stock mining would be in the owner’s interest. Here
9 A hundred years ago, the big businesses were identified as the “Wm. L. Bradley Manufacturing Com-
pany at Weymouth, the Pacific Guano Company at Wood’s Hole, and the Cape Cod Railroad Company”
(Palmer 1873). Today, it is Tyson Foods, Inc., ConAgra (“the country’s second largest diversified food
company”) and KPMG Peat Marwick (Greer 1995).Christy 298
the question is whether this is necessarily a bad thing. Certainly if it leads to species ex-
tinction, there may be a significant loss to society. But aside from that, the damage
would depend upon the speed of recovery of the stocks and the appropriate discount
rate. For stocks which are subject to wide natural fluctuations, the best approach
may be to fish them out when they are abundant and move to another stock when they
are not. This form of “pulse fishing” might allow a more efficient use of capital and
labor than attempting to maintain a certain yield in the interests of sustainability,
which, after all, is more of a biological concept than an economic one.
Problems of high grading and by-catch.  In ITQ systems, problems of multi-spe-
cies and multi-sized fisheries are particularly difficult to resolve and generally re-
quire a high degree of enforcement. The latter problem of high-grading would not
necessarily be significant under TURF/SURF systems since the owner(s) would
have a strong incentive to avoid taking sizes of individual fish which have lower
prices.
For interrelated stocks, however, there may be difficulties where the stocks are
subject to different SURFs. If the owner of one SURF takes, as by-catch, a stock
subject to another SURF, there is no innate incentive for him to avoid doing so.
This, however, might be resolved by establishing a cross-market between the two
owners under which the by-catch is taken only at a certain price paid as recompense
to the owner of the other stock. There may, nevertheless, be difficulties in dealing
with this problem.
Information problems.  Fishery resources have several attributes that make them
more difficult to deal with than land based resources, including:  (i) the mobility of
the stocks; (ii) their interrelationships as predator/prey species or competitive spe-
cies; (iii) the obscurity of the environment in which they reside; and (iv) their sus-
ceptibility to environmental influences.
Uncertainty with regard to yields is a hallmark of fisheries and will remain as a
problem for management. The most that can be said is that, with ownership of the
resources, some of the risks associated with uncertainty can be alleviated by the de-
velopment of a futures market.
The Evolution of the New Paradigm
I stated in the introduction that the move to systems of property rights is inexorable.
This assumption is based on the belief that fishermen, given the right conditions,
will find it in their own self-interest to acquire exclusive use rights and take on the
responsibilities of management; and that those conditions are now emerging.
The common property resource literature is replete with examples of communi-
ties which have acquired exclusive use rights (see for example: National Research
Council 1986; Cordell 1989; FAO 1993; and Ruddle 1994). Although some of this
literature relates to the holding of rights by individuals and corporations, the distinc-
tion between community and corporate rights is not generally made. “In as much as
corporate governance is most often associated with private property...it is somewhat
natural that corporate governance structures would not be considered for self-gover-
nance of common property resources” (Townsend 1995).
In making a similar point, Hannesson (in press) notes that “scholars of the com-
mon property tradition do, in my view, overemphasize the distinction between indi-
vidual and communal property rights. Both types of rights would appear to have a
common origin in human greed; both are an application of the rule ‘this is mine andOpen Access and Property Rights Regimes in Fisheries 299
not yours,’ or in the common property case ‘ours’ and not ‘yours.’ Why use rights
have taken the form of common rights and not individual rights often appears to de-
pend on technical circumstances such as economies of scale...The use rights (in
commons) do in some cases, however, come fairly close to being individual
rights.”10
In a review of some of these systems, I identified three different motivations for
the acquisition of exclusive use rights (Christy 1993). These were enhancement, ef-
ficiency, and equity. Of these, the first two apply equally well to the development of
both corporate and community rights. Examples of enhancement motivations occur
where aquaculture is feasible (using the term, enhancement, in a broad sense), e.g.,
oyster and other mollusc culture, shrimp ponds, and cage culture. They also occur
where it is possible to increase the concentration of fishery resources through such
means as artificial reefs and fish aggregation devices, as in the case of the Philip-
pine tuna fishermen, cited above. In most situations, investment in enhancement
does not take place unless the investor can receive a satisfactory return on his in-
vestment; and this generally requires that the investor have exclusive rights to the
fruits of his investment.
Efficiency motivations are important when the community or entrepreneur can
increase net economic returns by asserting exclusive use rights and the costs of do-
ing so are less than the benefits. The community TURFs common in Japanese
coastal waters originated with the efforts of the feudal lords to extract rents from the
coastal communities by the use of taxes. “In order to secure peace in fishing com-
munities and stable tax collection, the then-Japanese feudal government introduced
a standard regulation in 1743, called Urahoau to govern fishing villages and manage
fisheries” (Hirasawa 1993). Under this regulation “each local lord (han-shu) owned
adjacent coastal waters and controlled the fisheries therein” (Matsuda 1991).
Opportunities to control markets may be one of the most important incentives
for the adoption of closed access systems. One example occurred in the Yokohama
City Fisheries Cooperative in Japan. “Triggered by a sudden decrease in the value of
mantis shrimp following a bumper catch during the latter half of the 1970s, this co-
operative started to limit the total catch by allocating individual quotas to each boat
in 1977 in order to restrict the supply to the market” (Hasegawa 1993).11
Similar developments occurred in the U.S. in the past. For many years during
the 1930s and 1940s the menhaden fisheries of the Atlantic were under the control
of a monopsonist, the Smith Company, which effectively limited entry. Another ex-
ample has been described by McCay with regard to a fishermen’s group in New Jer-
sey. “As the seining fleet increased in size, the captains developed an overall fleet
quota on how much menhaden and porgies could be caught. The size of the quota
was determined through the cooperative’s manager by what the market would bear
without depressing prices. In addition, they developed a boat quota program”
(McCay 1989).  Libecap (1989) has pointed out “that fishermen unions and trade as-
sociations historically provided structured arrangements for restricting access by
nonmembers and for policing member compliance to harvest restrictions. In the
1930s, unions emerged along the U.S. coasts to limit entry and negotiate price
agreements with wholesalers and canners. Their policies appear to have increased
member incomes, but the unions were dismantled in the 1950s by the federal gov-
ernment for alleged violations of the Sherman (Anti-Trust) Act.” Similar approaches
based on market controls have been adopted in several Japanese fisheries, the Mar
10 Although the motivation for the claims of individual and communal rights may be the same, the con-
sequences may be quite different, as discussed by Townsend (1995).
11 It is noteworthy that some of the deficiencies of ITQ systems persist in this fishery. “A major continu-
ing problem of the mantis shrimp fishery is that of high grading” (Shiba Branch 1993).Christy 300
del Plata fishery in Argentina and among the prud’homme fishermen in the Mediter-
ranean (Christy 1993).12
An example of an efficiency and enhancement TURF resulting in a form of sole
ownership is that of the scallop fishery in Nemuro Bay, Japan (Nekaikyo No. 29
Committee, 1993). Prior to 1975, there were about 153 boats with a total catch aver-
aging 2,000 tons of scallops per year. When the catch declined, the five cooperatives
joined together to plant scallops. After recovery, the cooperatives chartered vessels
to harvest the scallops. In 1985, the sixteen chartered boats produced over 6,600
tons of scallops and annual profits were US $11 million, which was distributed
among the cooperatives and then divided up among the individual members.
The Japanese examples indicate the ability of groups of fishermen to adopt
management measures given the right conditions. In these cases, a form of TURF
provided the basis. In most cases, however, TURFs or SURFs do not exist and it is
necessary to create conditions which will facilitate the establishment of exclusive
use rights. Wilen suggests a process by which this might occur under license limit
schemes; the reduction in the number of players in the game through “limited entry
licensing/area licensing” (Wilen 1989). “The extent to which this process can be
pushed depends upon the fishery but the potential is very high for geographically
spread out periodic spawning and schooling fish such as herring and salmon. It is
conceivable, in fact, to move these fisheries almost to the point of “privatization,”
where a small group of fishermen effectively owns rights to certain spawning stocks
and very controlled fisheries take place only at river mouths (for returning salmon)
or specific spawning beds (for returning herring)” (Wilen 1989). Indeed, privatiza-
tion of salmon runs is common in Iceland, the UK, and other countries, and existed
in Alaska until 1959.13
Scott suggests that ITQs may provide an appropriate impetus. “Individual per-
manent catch quotas of a regulator-determined TAC are only a stage in the develop-
ment of management from licensing to private rights. This evolution can be ex-
pected to continue until the owner has a share in management decisions regarding
the catch; and further still, until he has an owner’s share in management of the bio-
mass and its environment. The expected evolution would begin with joint harvesting.
Their ownership of individual catch quotas gives fishermen an independent position
from which they can form owners’ alliances or committees. As users, they can organize
to coordinate searching activity and reduce wasteful racing. I would also expect them to
negotiate jointly with regulators over TACs, bycatches, openings, quota markets, en-
forcement records and other day-to-day issues. And I expect that they will, as owners,
mobilise self-enforcement to reduce poaching” (Scott 1989, see also Scott 1986).
For this evolutionary process to take place, it is essential that rights be credibly
permanent. Writing a decade ago Scott (1986) asked the question, “When is a right
not a right? When it is an instrument of administration. It is worth going into the
difference. The individual fisheries rights advocated in most of the literature are re-
garded by fishermen and politicians as theoretical and experimental. They are part
of a scheme that can be extended, or withdrawn, as its features and defects become
12 Scott (1993) believes that fishermen groups, which have adopted self-regulation measures, have failed
to control catch or effort. In referring to a study by Schlager (1990), he states “thus I believe that her
painstaking documentation may have confirmed an important general rule: that existing self-governed
fisheries worldwide tend to confine their rule making and enforcement to the simple problems of the
manner of fishing, not to the total amount of catch.” It is noteworthy, however, that where the objective
of the fishermen’s group is to control prices, it must also control catch and that there are several ex-
amples, in addition to the ones cited here, of self regulation of total catch or effort.
13 An excellent history of the Alaska salmon fishery can be found in Crutchfield and Pontecorvo, 1969.
This includes a thorough description of the dynamics by which salmon traps under private ownership
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evident. They are the creation of theorists and the plaything of bureaucrats, and they
need not be taken too seriously, for whatever the government imposes, it can by lob-
bying and collective action be induced to modify or withdraw. Perhaps for this rea-
son, most academic fisheries literature describes relying on rights over water, the
environment, and fisheries in tentative fashion as just one of several techniques of
economic regulation of common-property problems.”
At the time of writing the above, the experience in ITQs was relatively limited.
The ITQ systems in New Zealand did not begin until 1982. Experience since then
has tended to belie Scott’s apprehensions, as he himself has noted. The appearance
of sizeable economic rents in the form of the sale price of the quotas, in many of the
managed fisheries, indicates that fishermen perceive their rights to be more perma-
nent than not. The point is well taken because it emphasizes the critical deficiencies
in maintaining the present paradigm; that, as long as ITQs are viewed as “an instru-
ment of administration” rather than as a basis for property rights, both management
decisions and research will be misdirected. “These opportunities (for property rights
systems) are available already, but the fisheries rights literature has failed to see in-
dividual rights as the nuclei of larger sole-ownership corporations or collectives.
Thus it has not benefitted from studies of common-pool management of other re-
sources. The advantages and difficulties of modern collective oil-pool, pollution
emissions, pasture and irrigation water management are rarely referred to; perhaps
most of these are based on individual rights” (Scott 1989).
Summary and Conclusions
“The crucial point, however, is that economic rationalization  of ocean fisheries is
probably inevitable. A property-rights-based system, such as the ITQ system, ap-
pears to be the most effective way of accomplishing this. Therefore, it is advisable
to begin preparations for the eventual implementation of such a system in an orderly
fashion. The alternative is to risk being rushed, at a late stage, into a fisheries man-
agement system that may not be suitable” (Arnason 1993).
The question is one of determining the preparations that need to be undertaken.
There are many possible elements, one of which would be the studies that might be
undertaken by economists. Some tentative and preliminary suggestions for research
can be made.
•  Estimates of the economic rents. Estimates of rents that are potentially avail-
able in fisheries (which may be extraordinarily large) may be helpful in inducing
politicians to give greater consideration to property rights systems. It is surprising
that so few such studies have been done.
•  Studies of common-pool management of other resources, as suggested by
Scott. The lessons learned from such studies should be of value in the development
of policies for fisheries property rights systems. The abundant literature on tradi-
tional common property management systems is seriously deficient in the provision
of information on the development of the systems and on the conditions of member-
ship in the commons.
•  Identification of the conditions and incentives that will facilitate the estab-
lishment of property rights systems. For example, the use of fixed gear encourages
the users to acquire exclusive rights, and opportunities for such gear need to be
identified. The ability to influence market prices appears to be a strong motivation
for collective action and control of access. There should be studies on the ways this
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•  Analyses of present closed access systems. Many such studies exist and are
helpful in evaluating alternative approaches and measures. But they tend to evaluate
the systems in terms of the old paradigm, instead of the new one. There is a need to
examine the systems to determine the aspects which may impede or facilitate the
evolution to a property rights regime.
•  Compensatory mechanisms. The possibilities for using compensatory mecha-
nisms to alleviate the hardships of those who lose in the evolution of property rights
regimes should be explored.
•  Conflict resolution. Conflicts are likely to occur not only between and among
the owners of TURFs and SURFs, but also between them and other users of the
aquatic environments.
•  Tax systems. Only a few studies have been undertaken on taxing mechanisms
(see Johnson 1995). There is a need to examine the possible use of forms of property
taxes, transfer taxes, user fees, royalties, and auctions as means for extracting an ap-
propriate share of the rents (as well as a need for determining what is appropriate)
(see Hannesson, in press). Information on the use of such mechanisms in other com-
mon-pool resources would be valuable.
•  Studies of the concept of SURFs. Stock use rights systems have been men-
tioned peripherally in the literature, but with a few exceptions (Townsend 1995a) it
has not been subjected to critical analysis.
•  Labor mobility. There is a critical dearth of information on the mobility of la-
bor into and out of fisheries.
A general principle for future economic work would be to focus on those studies
that will facilitate the evolution to property rights regimes. This would include the
identification of the hazards along the evolutionary path and the development of
measures to overcome those hazards. The great danger is that the very real hardships
that are associated with the evolution may lead to the imposition of constraints that
will impede eventual rationalization.
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